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THE ANASTASOFF CASE AND THE JUDICIAL
POWER TO "UNPUBLISH" OPINIONS
Thomas R. Lee*
Lance S. Lehnhoft
When Faye Anastasoff challenged the IRS's denial of her claim
for a refund of her 1992 income taxes, she could hardly have
imagined that her simple tax refund case would turn into a constitutional debate over fundamental questions of the power of the judiciary and the Framers' understanding of stare decisis. 1 Initially,
Anastasoff's right to a refund appeared to turn on the unremarkable
question of the whether the "Mailbox Rule" should revive her otherwise time-barred claim.2 Because the Eighth Circuit had adopted the
IRS's construction of the Mailbox Rule in an earlier unpublished decision in Christiev. United States,3 Anastasoff's case seemed destined for a
routine, unnoticed dismissal.
On appeal, however, Anastasoff cited the applicable Eighth Circuit rule holding that unpublished decisions are at most "persuasive"
authority and are not "precedent," and accordingly offered her argument that Christiewas wrongly decided. 4 The Eighth Circuit panel re* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School.
Thanks to Kif Augustine-Adams, John Fee, Doug Floyd, Jim Gordon, Jim Rasband,
Lynn Wardle,.and Kevin Worthen for their comments on earlier drafts, and to Steve
Averett and Ben West for their helpful research assistance.
t J.D. Candidate, Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 2002.
1 SeeAnastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated en banc as moot,
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
2 See id. at 899.
3 Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446, at
*7-*8 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished).
4 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899 (quoting 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i)).
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not
cite them. When relevant to establishing the dotrines of resjudicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite any unpublished opinion. Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this
court if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve as well. A party who cites
an unpublished opinion for the first time at oral argument must attach a
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sponded by raising sua sponte the fundamental question of judicial
power 5 that is the subject of this Article. In an opinion by Judge Richard S. Arnold, the Eighth Circuit panel held that the Eighth Circuit
rule on unpublished opinions was unconstitutional and that the panel
was therefore constitutionally bound to follow Christie.6 Specifically,
Judge Arnold's opinion suggests that the Eighth Circuit's treatment of
unpublished authority is inconsistent with the historical treatment of
precedent at the time of the founding of the Constitution. 7 Because,
in Arnold's view, this historical treatment of precedent was incorporated in the 'judicial power" conferred on the federal courts under
Article III, the Eighth Circuit panel struck down as unconstitutional
the unpublished opinion rule relied on by Ms. Anastasoff.8
Judge Arnold's opinion immediately attracted significant attention, from both a sizable group of admirers9 and a similar band of
copy of the unpublished opinion to the supplemental authority letter required by FRAP 28(i). When citing an unpublished opinion, a party must
indicate the opinion's unpublished status.
8TH CIR. R. 28(A)(i).
5 See Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 899.
6 See id.
7 See id. at 905 ("The judicial power of the United States is limited by the doctrine of precedent. Rule 28A(i) allows courts to ignore this limit ....This discretion
is completely inconsistent with the doctrine of precedent .... Insofar as it limits the
precedential effect of our prior decisions, the Rule is therefore unconstitutional.").
8 See id. at 900 ("[W]e conclude that 8th Circuit Rule 28A(i), insofar as it would
allow us to avoid the precedential effect of our prior decisions, purports to expand
the judicial power beyond the bounds of Article III, and is therefore
unconstitutional.").
9 See, e.g., Howard J. Bashman, A Closer Look: The Unconstitutionality of Non-PrecedentialAppellate tulings, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 11, 2000, at 7, 7 ("Judge Richard
S. Arnold... has in that decision presented an impeccably reasoned explanation of
why the U.S. Constitution prohibits federal appellate courts from denying precedential effect to their opinions.") [hereinafter Bashman, A Closer Look]; Howard J.
Bashman, 3rd Circuit Should UseJudgment Orders-Wisely, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 8,
2001, at 9, 9 ("I continue to believe that the 8th Circuit correctly concluded that
federal appellate courts lack the power to deny precedential effect to their unpublished opinions."); David R. Fine, Keeping Mum Kills Precedents, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 19,
2001, at A21 ("Judge Arnold's constitutional analysis, which will surely be resurrected
in some other case, was right."); William P. Murphy, 8th Circuit Panel Declares Unpublished Opinions Precedential PA. L. WKLY., Sept. 18, 2000, at 13 (arguing that Anastasoff
sent the message that there is one body ofjudicial law and stare decisis applies universally); Roger Parloff, PublicationRights, AM. LAw., Oct. 2000, at 15, 15 ("[T]he animating force behind Judge Arnold's ruling was the simple recognition that technological
improvements-specifically, the now universal availability of online law libraries and
databases-have supplied us with a literal deus ex machina that solves the quandary
posed by unpublished opinions.").
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detractors. 10 It also provoked an immediate petition for rehearing en
banc. Before the broader circuit had a chance to tackle the constitutional question raised by Judge Arnold, however, the IRS refunded
Ms. Anastasoff's money and the case was dismissed as moot."
Despite the vacatur of Judge Arnold's opinion, the fundamental
question it raises seems unlikely to be extinguished quite that easily.

Judge Arnold himself seems likely to revive his objection to the unpublished opinion rule, and in any event, his now-vacated views undoubtedly will provide ammunition for litigants to insist on the
precedential status of unpublished opinions that support their
cause.1 2 The issue has nationwide significance-all circuits have
adopted some variation of the rule according diminished weight to
unpublished opinions. I3 Moreover, Judge Arnold's argument has im10 See, e.g., Recent Cases, 114 HARv. L. REv. 926, 943 (2001); SwiftEn Banc Review
Expected of Case Treating Unpublished Opinionsas Precedent,69 U.S.L.W. (BNA) No. 15, at
2227, 2227-29 (Oct. 24, 2000) (debating the significance of the Anastasoff decision).
The Eighth Circuit's conclusion regarding the bounds of Article III finds
little support in either history or practice. Although the court asserted that
the doctrine of precedent is implicit in the declaratory theory, it produced
scant evidence that the Framers relied on the explicit theory, let alone on
the implicit doctrine, when drafting the Constitution.

Recent Cases, supra at 243.
11

SeeAnastasoffv. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(noting that the IRS's payment of Ms. Anastasoff's $11,437.32 refund had rendered
the case moot).
12 Judge Arnold's en banc opinion indicated that "[t]he controversy over the status of unpublished opinions is, to be sure, of great interest and importance, but this
sort of factor will not save a case from becoming moot." Id. Arnold's comments indicate an interest on his part-and perhaps on the part of other judges in the Eighth
Circuit-to revisit the issue in an appropriate case. In an even more recent opinion,
Judge Arnold specifically recognized the fact that the court had no opportunity to
apply the Anastasoff rationale in regard to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 5-2, limiting
the precedential effect of unpublished opinions. See Rogerson v. Hot Springs Adver.
& Promotion Comm'n, 237 F.3d 929, 931 n.2 (8th Cir. 2001).
13 See D.C. CIR. R. 28(c) (prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions, orders, or other dispositions except to establish the binding or preclusive effect of the
disposition); 1sT Cm. R. 36(b) (2) (F) (prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions in
all "unrelated cases," presumably meaning only to assert resjudicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case); 2D CIR. R. § 0.23 (allowing judges to make oral opinions
from the bench, providing for the transcription of such opinions, and yet prohibiting
the citation of such opinions in "unrelated" cases); 3D CIR. R. IOP 6.2.1 (stating that a
"judgmentorder" [the functional equivalent of an unpublished opinion] has no precedential or institutional value); 4TH CIR. R. 36(c) (stating that citation to unpublished
opinions is disfavored, but nevertheless permissible when there is no published opinion on point); 5TH Cm. R. 47.5.3 (stating that "unpublished opinions issued before
January 1, 1996 [the effective date of the amended rule] are precedent," but noting
that since "every opinion believed to have precedential value is published, such an
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plications far beyond those that are contemplated in his opinion. His
conception of the judicial power would appear to call into question
the summary disposition rules that prevail in the Supreme Court and
in the courts of appeals, and even the non-precedential status of dis4
trict court decisions.'
Although a reexamination of the constitutionality of unpublished
opinion rules is certainly in order, the commentary unleashed on the
heels of the Anastasoff opinion has largely ignored Judge Arnold's historical premises, 15 focusing instead on questions of pragmatics, 16 or
unpublished opinion should normally be cited only when the doctrine of resjudicata,
collateral estoppel or law of the case is applicable"); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4
("[Ulnpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996 are not precedent, except for the resjudicata, etc., but may be cited as persuasive authority."); 6TH CIR. R.
206(c) (stating only that published opinions are binding on subsequent panels but
may not overrule them without en banc consideration; no apparent limitations on
citation of unpublished opifions, although they might not be treated as binding);
7TH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e) (stating that a court may dispose of an appeal by an
unpublished order or a published opinion; unpublished orders may only be cited for
purposes of establishing resjudicata, promissory estoppel or law of the case, whereas
published opinion may be cited without limitation as precedent; also prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions or orders from any court if that court prohibits its citation); 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i) (stating that unpublished opinions are not precedent and
that parties should not cite them, except that they may be cited to show resjudicata,
collateral estoppel, law of the case, and "if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve as
well"); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (a) to (b) (stating that any disposition that is not an opinion or
order designated for publication is not precedent and should not be cited except to
show resjudicata, etc.); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3(A)-(B) (stating that unpublished opinions
are not precedent and may only be cited to show resjudicata, etc., or if it has persuasive value, with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a published
opinion, "and it would assist the court in its disposition"); I TH CIR. R. 36-2 (stating
that unpublished opinions are not precedent but may be cited as persuasive authority); FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (prohibiting citation to opinions "designated as not to be
cited as precedent" unless it is to assert claim preclusion, issue preclusion, etc.). For a
summary of the various rules, see Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals
PerishIf They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions To Explain andJustifyJudicial
Decisions Pose a GreaterThreat?, 44 Am.U. L. REV. 757, 762 n.17 (1995); DeborahJones
Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REv. 71, 75-79 (2001).
14 See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-900 (8th Cir.), vacated en
banc as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000); see also infra Part III.B.2.
15 The HARVARD LAW REWIEW's "Recent Cases" series recently devoted a few pages
to Anastasoff See Recent Cases, supra note 10, at 940-46. This piece identifies, but
does not analyze in any detail, the question whether the Framers would have condemned a departure from precedent in the manner authorized by Rule 28A(i).
16 See, e.g., Bashman, A Closer Look, supra note 9, at 7-8 (explaining that "Judge
Richard S. Arnold... has in that decision presented an impeccably reasoned explanation of why the U.S. Constitution prohibits federal appellate courts from denying
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even constitutional implications under provisions outside of Article
D11.17 To the extent the current literature expressly addresses Judge
Arnold's historical argument,' 8 it does so without confronting three
precedential effect to their opinions," but nevertheless focuses on the implications of
the ruling for the Third Circuit, rather than the historical constitutional issues); J.
Wylie Donald & Pamela Keyl, Practicalitiesof Unpublished Decisions: PractitionersShould
Expect To See Briefs CitingMore Unpublished Decisions, andJudges PayingMore Attention to
Then, N.J. L.J., Dec. 4, 2000, at 28 (discussing the effect of the decision on litigating
attorneys); Fine, supra note 9, at A21 (arguing that "unpublished-so-nonprecedential
rules" invite abuse and discretion); Jeffrey Stempel, Federal Circuit Court Holds Unpublished "Nonprecedential"Judicial Opinions Unconstitutional,Igniting New Debate over the
Practice,NEv. LAw., Nov. 2000, at 23 (summarizing the case and discussing the possible
future effects thereof); see also Steven B. Katz, California'sCurious Practice of "Pocket
Review", 3 J. Ap'p. PRAc. & 'ROCESS 385 (2001). (criticizing limited citation rules and
identifying a specific practice in California resulting from such rules);J. Thomas Sullivan, Concluding Thoughts on the Practicaland Collateral Consequences of Anastasoff, 3 J.
App. PRoc. & PROCESS 425, 440-47 (2001) (raising questions about access to and reliance on the work product of appellate courts); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Making the Decision to Publish, 3 J. App. PRAc. &
PROCESS 325 (2001) (outlining the two main lines of criticism of unpublished opinions, and focusing on the process of making the decision to publish, guidelines for
publication, and enforcement of those guidelines within courts); Daniel B. Levin,
Case Note, Fairnessand Precedent-Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.),
vacated on other grounds 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000), 110 YALE L.J. 1295, 1300-02
(2001) (discussing the pragmatic issues of efficiency and equality of access).
17 See, e.g., Daniel N. Hoffman, Publicity and the JudicialPower, 3 J. App. PRAC. &
PROcESS 343 (2001) (discussing the case as raising various pragmatic concerns and as
presenting an issue of separation of powers); Salem M. Katsh & Alex V. Chachkes,
Constitutionality of "No-Citation"Rules, 3 J. App. PRAc. & PROCESS 287 (2001) (arguing
that limited citation rules are unconstitutional as violations of the First Amendment
protection of free speech and petition, and the separation of powers); Melissa H.
Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-PrecedentialDecision: An Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. App.
PRAC. & PROCESS 175 (2001) (arguing that limited citation rules might violate substantive and procedural due process).
18 See, e.g., R. Ben Brown, Judgingin the Days of the Early Republic: A CritiqueofJudge
RichardArnold's Use of History in Anastasoffv. United States, 3J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS
355, 361-83 (2001) (criticizing Arnold's argument by citing many cases from the early
republic in which courts did not adhere strictly to precedent; arguing that these examples indicate that even shortly after the adoption of Article III courts relied upon
multiple sources of law, including mere custom, and that some courts even held these
sources of common law to supercede statutory law); PollyJ. Price, Precedent andJudicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REv. 81 (2000) (defending Judge Arnold's
originalist analysis of the issue, suggesting that despite the inherent difficulties of an
originalist approach and the ambiguities of history, Arnold's argument is supported
by a preponderance of the evidence standard; also challenging claims that Arnold's
reasoning will prove problematic in future contexts); Brian Endter, Note, Death,
Taxes, and Unpublished Opinions: In the Wake ofAnastasoff v. United States and Its Holding That Eighth CircuitRule 28(A)(i) UnconstitutionallyExpands theJudicialPower,33 ARiz.
ST. LJ. 613, 624-26 (2001) (suggesting that founding-era commentators might have
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essential premises in his argument: (1) that the "declaratory theory"
of law was adopted by the Framers and is inconsistent with the modern treatment of unpublished opinions; (2) that the Framers' conception of precedent was static and not subject to further evolution; and
(3) that the original understanding foreclosed the possibility of a hierarchy of varying levels of judicial precedents.
This Article seeks to fill the void by offering comprehensive answers to these fundamental questions left open by the existing commentary. After describing in Section I the facts of the case and the
essence of Judge Arnold's opinion, Section II begins by placing his
position in pragmatic perspective. Here, the Article outlines some unforeseen implications of the constitutional objection raised by Judge
Arnold, and concludes that the practical consequences of adherence
to Anastasoffshould at least produce some skepticism as to whether it
is a constitutional mandate. Then, in Section III the Article evaluates
Judge Arnold's premise that the original understanding of the judicial
power precludes a rule that would deprive unpublished opinions of
precedential effect. Ultimately, we conclude that the founding-era
conception of precedent cannot be reconciled with the historical
model proposed by Judge Arnold, and in fact that the original understanding is most closely in line with the merely persuasive weight generally accorded unpublished opinions today. Moreover, we also reject
Judge Arnold's assertion that a hierarchy of precedents is historical
anathema-since the notion of a lower class of precedent finds a list
of fairly close historical analogues.
I.

THE ANASTASOFF CASE IN TIlE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

A.

The Factual Context

Despite the controversy created by the case, the factual context is
quite pedestrian. On April 13, 1996, Ms. Faye Anastasoff filed a claim
understood precedent to be something less strict than absolute adherence to prior
cases); Joshua R. Mandell, Note, Trees That Fall in the Forest: The PrecedentialEffect of
Unpublished Opinions,34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1255, 1276-84 (2001) (supporting Arnold's
assertion that the Framers believed in the importance of the doctrine of precedent,
although not questioning Arnold's assertion that the doctrine was well established at
the time of the founding; also suggesting that some early commentators understood
precedent to be something much more flexible than Arnold's strict doctrine of precedent); Recent Cases, supra note 10, at 943-44 (suggesting thatJudge Arnold may not
have considered sufficient sources of historical commentary and that some of that
commentary might favor an alternative conception of precedent); Evan P. Schultz,
Gone Hunting-JudgeArnold of the 8th Circuit Has Taken Aim at Unpublished Opinions, but
Missed His Mark, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 78 (identifying historical examples of
courts not bound by strict precedent).
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for a $6,436 refund of overpaid federal income tax, which she had
paid on April 15, 1993.19 The Internal Revenue Service denied her
claim on the ground that the Internal Revenue Code "limits refunds
to taxes paid in the three years prior to the filing of a claim." 20 The
IRS argued that because Ms. Anastasoffs claim was not received until
April 16, 1996, she was entitled to a refund only of tax paid on or after
April 16, 1993.21 Ms. Anastasoff argued that she should be protected
by "the Mailbox Rule," which, as codified in § 7502 of the United
States Code, deems claims to be received on the date they are mailed,
rather than the date received by the IRS, if it would otherwise be untimely.2 2 However, § 7502 applies only to claims that are untimely
filed,2 3 and both parties agree that the claim was timely filed. 24 The

timing dispute is not as to whether the claim was timely filed, but as to
25
whether the taxes were paid within the prior three years.
Fortunately for the IRS, the applicability of the Mailbox Rule to
timely filed claims was not a novel issue for the Eighth Circuit, since
the court had decided a case in 1992 that was almost factually identical.2 6 In Christie v. United States, an Eighth Circuit panel held, in an
unpublished opinion, that the Mailbox Rule does not apply to refund
claims that are filed in a timely manner, even if the taxes previously
were paid more than three years ago. 2 7 In her defense, Ms. Anastasoff
cited Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i), which states that unpublished opinions are not precedent and that parties should not cite them. 28 However, since the rule does not prohibit citation to unpublished cases,
29
the IRS cited the opinion as persuasive authority.
Ms. Anastasoff's counsel argued that although Christiewas directly
on point it was not binding on the court and that policy considerations favored an extension of the Mailbox Rule to situations such as
19 See Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 899. The amount of the refund ($6,436) is not referred to in the panel opinion, but is found in the en banc opinion. SeeAnastasoffv.
United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
20 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 899; 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b) (1994).
21 See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
22 Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 7502 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
23 26 U.S.C. § 7502.
24 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
25 See id.
26 See Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446, at
*1 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curium) (unpublished).
27 See id. at *7.
28 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 899.
29 See id. Rule 28A(i) specifically states that unpublished opinions may be cited if
it "has persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve as well." 8TH Cm. R. 28A(i).
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hers.30 After hearing the policy considerations from both parties, the
court filed its opinion, in which Judge Arnold introduced the panel's
sua sponte proposition that Rule 28A(i) was unconstitutional "because
it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond
31
the ljudicial."'
Ms. Anastasoff subsequently filed a petition for rehearing en
banc. Interstingly, the rehearing petition is the only brief filed in this
case, with any court, that discusses the constitutional issue. The IRS
responded by offering to refund Ms. Anastasoff's taxes, and the
panel's opinion was vacated as moot.32 While this may serve as an

efficient way to resolve the issue, it is nevertheless unsatisfying for
those concerned about the implications of the panel's arguments,
which are certain to resurface in the future.
B.

The Eighth CircuitPanel's Reasoning

The Eighth Circuit panel's constitutional condemnation of Rule
28A(i) is based primarily on a recitation of historical commentaries on
the doctrine of stare decisis. 33 The panel argues that Rule 28A(i)

"purports to expand the judicial power beyond the bounds of Article
III, and is therefore unconstitutional." 3 4 Article III states that "[t]he
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." 35 Without any specific language in Article
III requiring conformity to precedent, proponents of the panel's argument must rely on the premise that "the judge's duty to follow prece36
dent derives from the nature of the judicial power itself.
30 See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899.
31 Id.
32 Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
33 See Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 899-904. Judge Arnold cites such historical sources
as Sir William Blackstone, James Wilson, James Kent, Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew
Hale, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, William Cranch, and Justice Joseph Story.
See id. While these sources are certainly reliable and authoritative, a careful analysis
of the writings of these commentators suggests thatJudge Arnold misconstrued their
conception of stare decisis. See infra Part III.A.
34 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 900.
35 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
36 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 901. Judge Arnold's historical analysis depends upon
the assumption that the Framers intended the term "judicial power" to import some
notion of stare decisis. But see Recent Cases, supra note 10, at 944.
The Eighth Circuit's historical analysis is too cursory .... Notably absent
from Anastasoff are discussions of the ratifying debates in any of the states
and of the debates surrounding the drafting of Article III. These debates are
crucial because, although one person may have drafted the language, it is
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According to Judge Arnold, "[t]he doctrine of precedent was
37
well-established by the time the Framers gathered in Philadelphia,"
and "[t] o the jurists of the late eighteenth century (and thus by and
large to the Framers), the doctrine seemed not just well established
but an immemorial custom, the way judging has always been carried
out, part of the course of the law."3 8 In support of this proposition
the panel cites the writings of Hamilton and Madison in an effort to
show their acquiescence in these views. 3 9 The panel quotes the writings of Hamilton in The FederalistNo. 78 to show that, "[1] ike Blackstone, he recognized that this limit on judicial decision-making is a
'40
crucial sign of the separation of the legislative and judicial power.
The weight of the panel's argument is found in reference to the
writings of Sir William Blackstone, an eighteenth-century common-law
commentator whose views have elsewhere been deemed to reflect
those of his American contemporaries. 41 The panel not only argues
that the Framers ascribed to Blackstone's teachings regarding the general importance of precedent, but goes one step further in arguing
that the Framers believed that the "precedent" of which Blackstone
ratification by the People that ultimately imbues the Constitution with legitimacy. If the court examined these debates found nothing, then what is the
legitimate inference to draw from such silence? The court inferred a particular meaning because that meaning was 'in full view' of the Framers and
thereby, presumably, the ratifiers. In addition to raising quesions as to what
constitutes 'full view,' this method of constitutional interpretation would ultimately render every historical silence pregnant with meaning.
Id. (citing Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 904).
37 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 900 (citations omitted).
38 Id. (footnotes omitted).
39 See id. at 902-03.
40 Id. at 902 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library ed. 1938)). For a criticism ofJudge Arnold's interpretation of Hamilton's
discussion of precedent in The FederalistNo. 78, see infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. See also generally Thomas R. ,Lee, StareDecisis in HistoricalPerspective:From the
FoundingEra to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAIN. L. REv. 647 (1999) (tracing the evolution
of important strands of the Rehnquist Court's doctrine of stare decisis from foundingera treatises to early application in the Marshall and Taney Courts); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, AbrogatingStare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the PrecedentialEffect of
Roe and Casey ?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000) (arguing that Congress could require the
Court not to follow a precedent that the Court is otherwise persuaded is wrong on the
merits).
41 Anastosoff, 223 F.3d at 901 n.8; see also Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69
(1904) ("At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution [Blackstone's Commentaries] had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more
copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England, so undoubtedly the
framers of the Constitution were familiar with it.").
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was wrote necessarily encompasses all classes of judicial decision. 42
Quoting Blackstone, Judge Arnold concludes that "[b]ecause precedents are the 'best and most authoritative' guide of what the law is,
the judicial power is limited by them."43 In the panel's opinion,
"[tthe Framers thought that, under the Constitution, judicial deci44
sions would become binding precedents in subsequent cases."
Judge Arnold uses these and other quotes from Hamilton, Madison,
and others, to show that although no official reporting system existed
at the time the Constitution was written, the Framers nevertheless presumed that case law would become voluminous as a result of the ne45
cessity for precedents.
In selected writings of Blackstone, Coke, Hale, and others, Judge
Arnold claims to find the essence of the Framers' belief that the judicial power merely authorized a judge to declare the law, "not according to his own judgments, but according to the known laws. [Judges
are] not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old."4 6 This view of the judicial power, it is argued, not

only allows for stability in the law, but creates an appropriate separation ofjudicial and legislative power to the extent thatjudges have the
authority to "determine what the law is, not to invent it."47 It is this
limitation on the judicial power that the panel was afraid would be
42 'See Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 901-03. Several cases in the Eighth Circuit state that
unpublished opinions need not be given precedential deference. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Newhart, 892 F.2d 47, 50 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Leimer, 724 F.2d
744, 745-46 (8th Cir. 1984). Thus, under Arnold's own rule, the Anastasoffpanel had
no right to depart from those prior cases. Ironically, one of the cases from which the
panel departed was an opinion written by Judge Arnold, in which he stated that
[o]ur holding here is inconsistent with our prior unpublished decision in
Ewald v. The Cornelius Co., 696 F.2d 1000 (8th Cir. 1982). In Ewaldwe held
that the grant of relief in an adversary proceeding to lift a stay was an interlocutory order. We decline to follow this rule for several reasons. First, unpublished opinions of this Court are not intended to create binding
precedent. The decision of a panel not to publish an opinion usually represents the judges' view that the case is without substantial value as precedent
Leimer, 724 F.2d at 745-46. The Anastasoff court easily could have ruled against Ms.
Anastasoff and remained consistent with Leimer, since that case did not prohibit a
court from following an unpublished opinion, it simply did not require the court to
follow it. So it is not the result of the case that contradicts the rule, but the opinion
itself, which essentially adopts the opposite rule.
43 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 901 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*69).
44 Id. at 902.
45 See id. at 902-03.

46

Id. at 901 (citing 1 WILLIAM

47

Id.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*69).
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violated should the court hold that it was not bound to follow the
Christie case.
The panel describes these principles as the "declaratory theory of
adjudication," 48 a theory that legal historians largely attribute to
Blackstone. 49 As the panel interprets it, Blackstone's declaratory theory stands for the proposition that since judges have only the power to
declare the law, they are therefore bound to follow all decided cases.
II.

ANASTASOFF IN PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE

The Eighth Circuit's proposed prohibition of non-precedential
opinions threatens a fundamental upheaval of the current widespread
practice of the federal courts. For at least the past couple of decades,
the federal circuit courts generally have adhered to some variation on
the rule struck down byJudge Arnold. 50 The various circuits differ in
the degree to which they deprecate unpublished authority-a majority of circuits purport to preclude any citation to unpublished decisions except to support an assertion of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or law of the case; 5 1 others permit their citation as "persuasive" (but not binding) authority under varying degrees of limita48 Id. at 901-02 ("The Framers accepted this understanding of judicial power
(sometimes'referred to as the declaratory theory of adjudication) and the doctrine of
precedent implicit in it.").
49 See, e.g., Peter Wesley-Smith, Theories ofAdjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis,
in PRECEDENT IN LAW 73, 73 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) (stating that the declaratory theory received its most authoritative exposition by Blackstone).
50 The evolution of the non-publication rules in the circuit courts essentially began with the 1964 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, which suggested that the courts only publish cases that were of general
precedential value. ADMIN. OFF. OF Tm U.S. CTS., 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1965)
[hereinafter 1964 ANNUAL REPORT]. In 1972 the Administrative Office required that
every circuit adopt a publication plan. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 1972 ANNUAL

33 (1973) [hereinafter 1972 ANmUAL REPORT]. It was this 1972 report that
resulted in the most dramatic increase in the number of unpublished opinions in the
circuit courts. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 13, at 75-79. In their study of the
increase in unpublished opinions, Merritt and Brudney suggest that while until the
1970s most circuits published a majority of their opinions, by 1979 half of the circuit
opinions were unpublished, and that number increased to two-thirds by 1989 and to
nearly eighty percent in 2001. See id. at 75-76 (citing ADMIN. OFF.OF THE U.S. CTS.,
1979 ANNUAL REPORT 344-46 tbl.B-1 (1980); ADMIN. OF. OF THE U.S. CGs., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 109 tbl.S-5 (1990); ADMIN. OFF.OF THE U.S. GTS., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT
49 tbl.S-3 (2000)).
51 See D.C. CR.R. 28(c); lsT CR. R. 36(b) (6); 2D CIR. R. § 0.23; 3D Cm. R. IOP
6.2; 5TH CI. R. 47.5; 7TH Cm. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3; FED. Cm. R.
47.6.
REPORT
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tions;5 2 but all agree that some hierarchy of authority relegating
unpublished decisions to second-class status is a practical necessity.53
This approach is traceable in part to a report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in 1964. 54 In that report, the

Administrative Office recommended that judges publish only those
opinions that "are of general precedential value." 55 Selective publication was necessary, according to the report, "in view of the rapidly
growing number of published opinions of the courts of appeals and of
the district courts ...and the ever increasing practical difficulty and
economic cost of establishing and maintaining accessible private and
public law library facilities. '56 In 1972, the Administrative Office issued another report requiring that all circuits adopt a publication
plan.5 7 Since the 1964 Report, and particularly since the 1972 Report,

all of the federal circuit courts have adopted some variation on the
rule condemned by judge Arnold in the Anastasoff panel decision. 5 8
Moreover, the number of unpublished decisions in the courts of
appeals has risen markedly in recent years. After the 1972 Report, the
courts responded slowly, and in the mid-1970s the federal appellate
courts still published a "substantial majority of their opinions. '59 By
the late 1970s however, nearly half were unpublished, and by 1989
over two-thirds were unpublished. 60 -The latest reports suggest that
52 See 4TH CIR. R. 36(c) (stating that citation to unpublished opinions is disfavored, but nevertheless permissible when there is no published opinion on point);
6TH CIR. R. 206(c) (stating only that published opinions are binding on subsequent
panels but may not overrule them without en banc consideration; no apparent limitations on citation of unpublished opinions, although they might not be treated as
binding); 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i) (stating that "[u] npublished opinions are not precedent
and parties generally should not cite them," except that they may be cited to show res
judicata, collateral estoppel, law of the case, and "if the opinion has persuasive value
on a material issue and no published opinion of this or any other court would serve as
well"); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3 (stating that unpublished opinions are not precedent and
may only be published to show resjudicata, etc., or if it has persuasive value, the issue
has not been addressed in a published opinion, "and it would assist the court in its
disposition"); 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 (stating that unpublished opinions are not precedent
but may be cited as persuasive authority).
53 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
54 1964 ANNUAL REPORT, supa note 50, at 11.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57

1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 50, at 33.

58
59
60

See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 13, at 75-76.
See id. at 75 n.13.
See id.; DONNA STIENSTRA, UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS:

PROBLEMS OF AcCESS AND

USE IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS 40 tbl.2 (Fed.Jud. Ctr., Staff Paper 1985) (finding that

48.8% of decisions in 1981 were not published).
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nearly eighty percent of all federal appellate opinions are
61
unpublished.
The sheer volume of appellate cases indicates the difficulty that
would accompany a requirement that all of these unpublished opinions be treated as binding authority. If an appellate court were faced
with a rule mandating that all of its decisions would bind future
panels, the stakes would be higher in each individual case, and judges
would be pressed to devote significantly more time and effort to each
case. The attention required, moreover, would not be directed to assuring that the proper result would be reached, but to considering the
possible import of each word that is used in an opinion for fear that it
might be improperly extended in a future case. Because unpublished
opinions are supposed to be handed down in routine cases where new
precedent is not needed, this increased attention to the opinion itself
arguably would be unproductive.
Judge Arnold's rule would also require judges to spend more
time reviewing decisions of other panels in order to identify cases that
should be reviewed en banc, since that would be the only way to eliminate a poorly reasoned opinion that would otherwise bind the rest of
the circuit. Additionally, the rule would undoubtedly compound the
number of en banc reviews, thus compounding the growing strain on
the judiciary.
And this is only a small part of the pragmatic convulsion that
would be unleashed on the slippery slope of Judge Arnold's opinion.
Judge Arnold's analysis leaves no room for distinguishing the 'judicial
power" exercised by the federal circuits from the 'Judicial power" exercised by the federal district courts. The Constitution itself draws no
distinction between the trial courts and intermediate courts of appeals; both are vested with the same 'Judicial power" granted generally to the "inferior Courts" under Article III. Thus, if the judicial
power conferred by Article III mandates a rule of "horizontal" stare
decisis applicable to all decisions of the circuit courts, then there is no
reason to believe that a similar rule would not bind the district courts
to accord "horizontal" deference to their own decisions.
Such a rule would paralyze the federal court system. The volume
of cases in the courts of appeals pales in comparison to the caseload of
the district courts. The most recent Report of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shows that 56,236 appeals were filed
in the circuit courts, while 320,194 cases were filed in the district
61

See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 13, at 76 (citing

CTs., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 49 tbl.S-3 (2000)).
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courts. 62 Unlike their circuit court counterparts, district court judges

have long rendered decisions without any pretense of being "bound"
to follow them in future cases. 63 Such an approach is a practical necessity. Without it, district court judges would become perpetually enmeshed in the task of fine-tuning the text of their decisions in an
effort to fly-speck around any concerns that might arise if their analysis were extended to an unforeseen set of facts.
Since Arnold's criticism of Rule 28A(i) is rooted in the judicial
power itself, his argument applies to much more than the treatment
of unpublished opinions, but to every exercise of the judicial power.
Taken to its extreme, Judge Arnold's understanding of the judicial
power would require that every action under the authority of the judicial power be given conclusive precedential effect. The pragmatic effect of this argument would be to require deference to such informal
"precedents" as the decisions of circuit motions panels and the procedural and evidentiary rulings in the district courts. 64 Such a result
would not only create a severe logistical burden on the federal courts
at all levels, but would result in a fundamental change in the role of
65
the judiciary.
62 See 1999 DIR. OF ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 116, 125,
130, 186 tbls.B-6, B-8, C, & D (2000), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus1999/contents.html.
63 See infra Part III.B.2.a.
64 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing several types of judicial decisions that have
historically been deprived of binding precedential effect such as district court rulings,
summary dispositions, evidentially rulings and orders, etc.; illustrating that it is completely consistent with the Blackstonian view of precedent to have more than one
degree of precedent).
65 The more general policy question of the value or validity of rules and policies
favoring non-publication ofjudicial decisions has received significant attention since
the circuit courts began adopting non-publication rules following the 1964 Report of
the Administrative Office. Judge Arnold himself has authored one article aimed at
this policy question, suggesting that his historical analysis may not be based simply on
an academic or philosophical devotion to history. See Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished
Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. Ap. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 222 (1999) (discussing the general validity of non-publication rules, but specifically raising the issue of whether unpublished opinions should be treated as precedential). Ninth CircuitJudges Kozinski
and Reinhardt have authored another piece addressing this policy question. SeeAlex
Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Why We Don't Allow Citation to Unpublished Decisions,
CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43, 81 (expressing serious concerns about the burden that
publication of all cases would place on the courts; specifically arguing that non-publication rules are necessary to ensure that judges carefully and dutifully fulfill their
responsibilities, and that "[b]ased on [their] combined three decades of experience
as Ninth Circuit judges, [they] can say with confidence that citation of [unpublished
opinions] is an uncommonly bad idea" that not only gives some lawyers an undeserved advantage in some cases but also is damaging to the court). For more on the
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Judge Arnold's Eighth Circuit panel opinion offers a preemptive
strike against these pragmatic concerns. It may be asserted, Judge Arnold conceded, "that the volume of appeals is so high that it is simply
unrealistic to ascribe precedential value to every decision," in the
sense that the courts of appeals "do not have time to do a decent
enough job... to justify treating every opinion as a precedent."6 6 But
"[i]f this is true," Judge Arnold's response is that "the remedy is not to
create an underground body of law good for one place and time
only," but "to create enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if
that is not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a competent job with each case." 67 "If this means that the backlogs will
underlying policies favoring publication or non-publication ofjudicial decisions, see
also Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., The No-Citation Rulefor Unpublished Opinions:Do the Ends
of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate CourtsJustify the Means of Secrecy?, 50 S.C.L. REv.
235, 259 (1998) (standing for the compromise position-accepted in several circuits-that courts should "allow the citation of unpublished opinions as persuasive
authority but not as binding precedent"); MarthaJ. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of
Appeals PerishIf They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions To Explain andJustify
JudicialDecisions Pose a GreaterThreatP, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 757, 786-87, 791-97 (1995)
(suggesting that selective publication creates an unreasonable burden on attorneys
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in requiring that they perform
a reasonable inquiry before filing a complaint; also suggesting that selective publication creates uncertain precedent and complicated legal research); Boyce F. Martin,
Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIo ST. LJ. 177, 193-94 (1999) (arguing
that "[i]f we do not discourage citations to unpublished opinions, then we are creating a type of second-class precedent," a slight variation on judge Arnold's argument);
RobertJ. Martineau, Restrictions on Publicationand Citation ofJudicial Opinions:A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. J.L. RFom 119, 149 (1994) (arguing that courts should adopt
the following rules: (1) internal review of a decision not to publish; (2) a party (or a
non-party) should be able to petition the court to publish an unpublished statement
of reasons; (3) unpublished opinions should not be in the form of an opinion, but
rather a letter from the clerk to the parties; and (4) each court should rigorously
enforce its no-citation rules); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87
MICH. L. REv. 940, 962 (1989) (suggesting that unpublished opinions inhibit attorneys' and scholars' ability to "discern trends in [government] agency decision-making .... [I]n essence the practice of selective publication obstructs effective oversight
of government litigation and decision-making by both interested and disinterested
observers" and that a "system of universal publication with limited citation would
eliminate this obstruction"); Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CAL.L. REv. 541, 574 (1997) ("A rule
of limited publication that allows for both electric dissemination of, and citation to,
all unpublished opinions for their persuasive value strikes the best balance.").
66 Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir.), vacated en banc as moot,
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
67 Id.
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grow," Judge Arnold's conclusion is that "the price must siill be
paid."

68

In a sense, Judge Arnold has it right on this point. If the Constitution clearly requires that federal courts invest the time necessary to
render precedential opinions at every turn, then the press of time is
an insufficientjustification for ignoring this requirement. 69 Thus, the
principal question presented by Judge Arnold's opinion is not
whether pragmatic difficulty can justify a constitutional defect, but
whether the constitutional defect is really there to begin with. 70
That is not to say, however, that the overwhelming upheaval required byJudge Arnold's opinion is entirely irrelevant to the constitutional analysis. Surely the courts can (and should) take account of the
practical consequences of their choice between two alternative constructions of the Constitution. If one of two equally plausible constructions of the 'judicial power" clause of Article III would require a
fundamental revision of the structure and extent of the federal court
system, surely the alternative construction that does not envision such
a sea of change should be favored.
On the other hand, it may well be thatJudge Arnold's approach
would have a very different effect on judicial practice. A judge faced
with a rule assigning precedential effect to every word uttered in his
opinions would likely spurn the notion of explaining his decisions in
writing, realizing that any effort to do so might tie his hands in unforeseen circumstances in the future. One-word summary affirmances
and reversals would become the order of the day on appeal, and oneword denials or grants of motions would be the likely decision at the
district court level. 7 1 Such decisions would not present a significant
risk of tying the judge's hands in future cases, as the result itself would
have little or no precedential power.
This pragmatic effect also calls Judge Arnold's rule into question.
It demonstrates that a constitutional prohibition on non-binding, unpublished opinions will only discourage the result that he thinks is
required by Article Ill-instead of producing more careful, better-reasoned opinions in all cases, it is likely to discourage the drafting of any
68 Id.
69 See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 108 (2000) ("The press for time does not
diminish the constitutional concern" associated with diluting the voting power of a
particular segment of the population.).
70 See discussion infra Part III.A.
71 See Stempel, supra note 16, at 24 (identifying this potential result of the Anastasoff opinion, and noting that such an incentive might "result in less substantive review on appeal rather than more-the opposite of what Anastasoff appears to
intend").
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opinions in any case that would otherwise be resolved by a non-binding, unpublished opinion. Thus, the net result of the Anastasoff rule
would be to deprive the parties of the benefit of the court's analysis of
their case and to leave them with only a one-word statement of the
result reached by the court.
Once again, the pragmatic effect of this "rule" should cause the
courts to think twice before they adopt it. A rule that invites such easy
circumvention-in direct contravention of the policies that motivate
it-should not blithely be embraced.
III. ANASTASOFF IN HisTORic.AL PERSPECTIVE
Judge Arnold's constitutional analysis is premised on his under72
standing of the historical practice of the courts in the founding era.
Arnold concludes (citing Blackstone, Coke, and others) that "[t]he
doctrine of precedent was well-established by the time the Framers
gathered in Philadelphia." 7-3 Indeed, "[t] o the jurists of the late eighteenth century," Arnold asserts that "the doctrine seemed not just well
established but an immemorial custom, the way judging had always
been carried out, part of the course of the law." 74
At one level, this first step in the Anastasoff analysis seems largely
unassailable. 75 It is undoubtedly true that British 'Jurists of the late
eighteenth century" had adopted some notion of the role of precedent and that some such conception had also been adopted in this
country.76 But that general statement begs the crucial question-

whether the founding-era conception of precedent leaves room for a
rule that treats unpublished opinions as non-binding, merely persuasive authority.
Judge Arnold's position on that issue seems to take two different
forms in his Anastasoff opinion. Initially, Arnold seems to stake out
the position that the historical understanding of stare decisis pre72

See supra Part I.B (discussing Judge Arnold's reasoning).

73

Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.

74 Id.
75 But see discussion infra Part III.B.1 (suggesting that there is a debate as to
whether our modem conception of the role of precedent had taken firm root at the
time of the founding).
76 See the discussion infra Part III.A-B in which we discuss Blackstone's declaratory theory as it was accepted in early Britain and the pre-1787 colonies. The historical evidence clearly shows that'Blackstone and his contemporaries accepted some
concept of precedent, just as it also suggests that Hamilton, Kent, Madison, and their
colonial contemporaries also accepted such a concept. Our argument is not that they
did not accept the concept of precedent, but rather that they did not understand
precedent to require what Judge Arnold would suggest they did.
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cludes the treatment of judicial decisions as "merely persuasive" authority. 7 7 Under this approach, founding-era precedents were strictly

binding on future courts and could not be treated as anything less
than that. Later in the opinion, however, Judge Arnold appears to
back away from this approach, suggesting that the Constitution does
not require "some rigid doctrine of eternal adherence to precedents,"
but merely demands that all decisions be given the same degree of
deference. 78 Thus, under this view, a circuit court "precedent[ ] can
be changed," but only "by the en banc Court" and only when the "reasons for rejecting it [are] made convincingly clear." 79
Neither of these approaches can survive careful historical analysis. First, the founding generation would not have been at all offended by the treatment of prior decisions as merely persuasive (and
not binding) authority. If anything, the status generally accorded to
unpublished opinions is more in line with the founding-era conception
of precedent under the declaratory theory.8 0 Second, the conception
of a hierarchy of different levels of precedent also has deep historical
roots. 8 1 Unpublished opinions are closely analogous to other kinds of
judicial decisions that have long been thought to fall outside the cate82
gory of binding authority.

77 This position is clear from the fact that the panel felt it could not even get to
the substantive legal issues involved in the case because of the binding effect of Christie. The court could have come to the same conclusion (affirming the district court
decision) without relying on this constitutional argument by simply basing its decision
on the persuasive nature of the Christie case rather than the binding nature of the

unpublished opinion. Rather than reach its conclusion in this manner, the panel
instead held that "Ms. Anastasoff's [substantive legal claim] was directly addressed
and rejected in Christie"and that Rule 28A(i) did not free them from their "obligation
to follow that decision." Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 905.
78 Id. at 904-05.
79 Id.
80 See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text. In these notes we discuss the
view.of the Framers, and their English contemporaries, that judicial decisions were
merely evidence of the law and as such could be disregarded; whereas, current circuit
rules require that published opinions be treated as binding precedent and only disregarded following an en banc overruling. Such modem treatment appears to grant
more binding authority to published opinions than Blackstone and others would have
granted; whereas, current treatment of unpublished opinions is very consistent with
the view that judicial decisions are evidence of the law.
81 See infra Part III.B.2.
82 See infra Part III.B.2.
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The Declaratory Theory in the FoundingEra:"Binding"or "Merely
Persuasive"Authority ?

Judge Arnold bases his historical conception of precedent on the
views espoused by Blackstone, Hamilton, and others.8 3 Quoting
Blackstone, Arnold asserts that "each exercise of the judicial power'
requires judges 'to determine the law' arising upon the facts of the
case."8 4 Because Blackstone understood that ajudicial decision would
set down "a permanent rule," and because ajudge at common law was
"sworn to determine [the law], not according to his own judgments,
but according to the known laws," 85 Arnold concludes that the modem treatment of unpublished opinions as merely persuasive authority
86
is inconsistent with Blackstone's vision of the 'Judicial power.
Arnold purports to find a similar view in the writings of Alexander Hamilton. Specifically, Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78
that in order "[t] o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
Moreover, Hamilton
particular case that comes before them. .
contemplated that judges would give their opinions "long and laborious study" and understood that the record of precedents "must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk."8 8 Despite these
concessions, Arnold concludes that Hamilton and his contemporaries
".."87

83
84

*25):

See supra Part I.B.
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

85 Id. (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES *69).
86 See id. Judge Arnold relies not only on Blackstone, but also Sir Edward Coke
and Sir Matthew Hale for this proposition, relying mostly on their insistence upon the
importance of precedent and the judicial decision as evidence of the law. See id. (citing 4 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
138 (London, E&R Brooke 1797) (1642) ("[A] judicial decision is to the same extent a
declaration of the law."); MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 44-45 (Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1713) ("Judicial
decisions [have their] Authority in Expounding, Declaring and Publishing the Law of
this Kingdom .... .")). In regard to the Framers' conception of the judicial power,
Judge Arnold relies on some of the writings of Hamilton and Madison. Id. at 902 n.10
(citing Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE PoLricAL THOUGHT OFJAMES
MADISON 390, 390-93 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981) (describing the "authoritative force" of "judicial precedents" as stemming from the "obligation arising from

judicial expositions of the law on succeeding judges")).
87 Id. at 902 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 510 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Modem Library ed. 1938)).
88 Id.
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"thought that, under the Constitution, [all] judicial decisions wotild
become binding precedents in subsequent cases."8 9
Judge Arnold's conclusion falters on its essential historical premise that the common-law conception of precedent-rooted in the
"declaratory theory"-encompasses a firm mandate to adhere to
precedents. Although he accurately quotes Blackstone, Hamilton,
and others in attempting to discern the common-law conception of
precedent, his quotes are taken quite out of context and his analysis is
premised on a fundamental misunderstanding of the declaratory theory. 90 As explained in detail below, a faithful interpretation of the
Blackstonian conception of precedent thoroughly undermines Judge
Arnold's constitutional analysis at a threshold level, as the declaratory
theory of the founding generation is most closely aligned with the current treatment accorded to unpublished opinions, not with the more
rigid adherence extended to their published counterparts. 9 1
Judge Arnold's notion "that the doctrine of stare decisis is a relic
of "immemorial custom"-"the way judging had always been carried
out"92-is

surely an overstatement. The general consensus among le-

gal historians is that the doctrine of stare decisis is of "relatively recent
origin. ' 93 Indeed, at least as late as the eighteenth century, commonlaw judges and commentators generally adhered to Matthew Hale's
understanding that "Decisions of Courts ofJustice" serve to "bind [] as
a Law between the Parties thereto," but that otherwise "they do not
make a Law properly so called (for that only the King and Parliament
can do). 94 In the words of Harold Potter in his HistoricalIntroduction
to English Law and Its Institutions, "during the eighteenth centur[y] we
89 Id.
90 See infra notes 119-31 (discussing Judge Arnold's analysis of Hamilton's writings, and specifically identifying the context in which the comments quoted by Judge
Arnold were made). It also appears that Judge Arnold has fundamentally misconstrued early conceptions of the doctrine of precedent under the declaratory theory.
While Blackstone, and other founding-era adherents to the declaratory theory, accepted the importance of a respect for precedent, their understanding of the concept
of precedent did not exclude the possibility that those precedents were simply persuasive. Indeed, Blackstone's own description of the role of judicial decisions refers to
them as evidence of what the law is, and not as the law themselves. See Anastasoff,223
F.3d at 901 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69).
91 See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (arguing that Blackstone's view
of precedent was actually more consistent with the current treatment of unpublished
opinions than it was with the absolute binding treatment granted published

opinions).
92 Anastasoff 223 F.3d. at 900.
93 Lee, supra note 40, at 659.
94 MATTHEW HALE, THE HIsTORY

OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND

45 (Charles

M. Gray ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1713); see also SIR CARLETON

KEMP ALLEN,
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find cases constantly followed in practice but a tendency to assert that
they were not binding in theory."95
This notion of the role of judicial decisions was the product of
the "declaratory theory," which held that the law had a "Platonic or
96
ideal existence" before it was ever reduced to a judicial opinion.
Under this view, any decision later deemed inconsistent with this
"ideal" need not be overruled but could simply be superseded by a
new decision as a "reconsidered declaration as a law from the
97
beginning."
Thus, under the declaratory theory, judicial decisions were
viewed as evidence of the law, but not as law itself. 98 This view was
embraced even by Sir Edward Coke, 99 whom Judge Arnold identified
as the champion of stare decisis "most admired and most often cited
LAW IN THE MAKING 209-19 (7th ed. 1964); 12 WILIAM HoLDSwORTH,A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 146-62 (1938).

95 HAROLD POTrER, PoTrER's HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS 279 (A.K.R. Kiralfy ed., 4th ed. 1958).
In this period the judges did not regard themselves as absolutely bound by
earlier decisions, and this attitude of mind lasted well into the fifteenth century, and in a modified form down to the nineteenth century....

ITS

During the latter half of the seventeenth and during the eighteenth centuries we find cases constantly followed in practice but a tendency to assert that
they were not binding in theory.
Id. at 275, 279.
96 See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (1932)
(rejecting due process challenge to Montana court's refusal to give retroactive effect
to its decision overruling a past decision). Justice Holmes denigrated the declaratory
theory of law in his famously colorful terms-as a "brooding omnipresence in the
sky." S. Pac. Co.v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
97 Great N. Ry., 287 U.S. at 365. Blackstone himself wrote that when "the former
decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad
law, but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as
has been erroneously determined." 1 WiLLLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70.
98 See HAuL, supra note 94, at 45; see also 1 MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAw *141.
[T] he decisions of courts ofjustice... have a great weight and authority in
expounding, declaring, and publishing what the law of this kingdom is; especially when such decisions hold a consonancy and congruity with resolutions
and decisions of former times. And though such decisions are less than a
law, yet they are a greater evidence thereof than the opinion of any private
persons, as such, whatsoever.
Id.
99 E.g., 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FiRST PART OF THE INsTrrIUES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARY UPON Lr1TLETON *254(a) (noting that reported decisions
are "the best proofes [sic] [of] what the law is") (emphasis added).
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by American patriots."1 00 Lord Coke conceived of reported decisions
as "the best proofes [sic] [of] what the law is," but not as law itself.10 1
After all, under the declaratory theory of judicial decisionmaking,
"[i] t is the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law,
according to the golden mete-wand of the law and not by the crooked
1 0°2
cord of discretion.
Blackstone's views were roughly to the same effect. Judge Arnold
may be correct to identify Blackstone as an "influential[ ]" exponent
of the 'Judge's duty to follow precedent. 10 3 Commentators (present
company included) have identified Blackstone as "one of the early
authorities to speak of 'the rule of precedent as one of general obligation.' "1 0 4 Thus, language may be culled from Blackstone's Commentaries (such as that quoted by Judge Arnold) that would seem to
embrace a firm notion of "an established rule to abide by former
precedents," where the same points come again in litigation.' 0 5
But the quotes lifted from the Commentaries by Judge Arnold fail
to put Blackstone's views in the relevant context-of the content of
the rule and the nature of its exceptions. Blackstone's "rule" was not
a hard-and-fast one; it was substantially mollified by the declaratory
theory ofjudicial decisions. As Blackstone explained in a passage that
immediately follows the one quoted by Judge Arnold, "this rule admits
of exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly contrary to the divine
law.' 0 6 In other words, the "law" and the "opinion of the judge," according to Blackstone, "are not always convertible terms, or one and
the same thing; since it sometimes may happen that the judge may
07
mistake the law.'1
Blackstone explained the difference between "law" and the "opinion of the judge" in declaratory terms:
But even in such cases [in which an earlier decision is set aside] the
subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the
former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not
Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 n.6 (8th Cir.), vacated en banc as
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
2 COKE, supra note 99, at *254(a).
Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 902 (quoting 1 COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 51 (1642)).
103 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 901.
104 Lee, supra note 40, at 661 (citing MAX RADIN, STABILITY IN LAW 18 (1944)).
105 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *69).
106 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *69-*70.
107 Id. at *71.
100
moot,
101
102
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that such a sentence was bad law; but that it was not law; that is, that
it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined.10 8
Like Coke, Hale, and others, Blackstone conceived of a judicial
decision more as evidence of the law than as law itself.10 9 An individual decision could easily be set aside as "not law" if it was contrary to
the "established custom of the realm."" 0
This declaratory view of precedent was also embraced in this
country. Judge Arnold cites the founding-era American commentator
James Kent in support of his conclusion that the current treatment of
unpublished opinions is inconsistent with founding-era practice.'1 '
But Kent's Commentariesindicate his acquiescence in Blackstone's declaratory theory, since as Kent understood it, "[a] solemn decision
upon a point of law, arising in any given case, becomes an authority in
a like case, because it is the highest evidence which we can have of the
law applicable to the subject."" 2 Kent even suggested that "Even a
series of decisions are not always conclusive of what is law ....
Early colonial and state courts took a similar approach. During
the colonial period, "decided cases were believed to contain evidence
of the law," and nothing more than that. 1 4 It was not until the midnineteenth century that "the theory that cases were merely evidence of
the law was under heavy attack by the theoricians [sic] .,"15 Thus, state
courts in the founding era thought that "a decision" was only "prima
facie evidence" of what the law is,'1 6 and that "[a] court is not bound
to give the like judgment, which had been given by a former court,
unless they are of [the] opinion that the first judgment was according
7
to law.""

108

Id. at *70.

109 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (discussing the views of Coke and
Hale on the role of reported cases as evidence of the law).

110

See 1 BLACKSToNE, supra note 97, at *70.

111

See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 902 n.12 (8th Cir.), vacated en

banc as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
112

JAmEs KENT, COMIMENrARES ON AMERICAN LAW

113

Id. at *477.

*475.

114 Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The CriticalYears, 1800 to
1850, 3 AM.J. LEGAL Hisr. 28, 33 (1959).
115 Id. at 36.
116 Henry v. Bank of Salina, 5 Hill 523, 535 (N.Y. 1843).
117 Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull, 1 Dall. 175, 178 (Pa. 1786).
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Alexander Hamilton's discussion in The FederalistNo. 78 does not
suggest otherwise. Arnold quotes Hamilton accurately, but again he
does so quite out of context. n 8 As one of us has noted elsewhere:
Viewed in isolation, Hamilton's side-bar on precedent [in Federalist
No. 78] might be construed to conceive of a strict rule demanding
adherence to precedent under all circumstances. Hamilton wrote
of a "binding" notion of stare decisis under which "precedents"
would "define and point out" the "duty" of the court "in every particular case." In Hamilton's view, the policies of certainty and judicial integrity support this doctrine: adherence to "strict rules and
precedents" is necessary "[ft]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the
courts."1 19

But Judge Arnold errs in apparently ascribing to Hamilton the
view that precedents necessarily bind the judge in every case. "Federalist No. 78 was hardly conceived as a comprehensive exposition of the
doctrine of stare decisi§, and Hamilton's statement of a prima facie rule of adherence to precedent should not be construed to ex' 120
clude the existence of exceptions or countervailing considerations."
When Hamilton spoke of the judge's "duty," he was referring not only
118 See Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 902 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
Like Blackstone, [Hamilton] thought that "[ft]he courts must declare the
sense of the law," and that this fact means courts must exercise "judgment"
about what the law is rather than "will" about what it should be ...-. Like
Blackstone, he recognized that this limit on judicial decision-making is a crucial sign of the separation of the legislative and judicial power .... Hamilton concludes that "[ft]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case
that comes before them .... " The Framers thought that, under the Constitution, judicial decisions would become binding precedents in subsequent
cases.
Id. Although Judge Arnold correctly quotes Hamilton, it is important to note that the
purpose of The FederalistNo. 78 was to discuss the manner of appointment and the life
tenure of federal judges. See Paulsen, supra note 40, at 1573-74.
Hamilton is not in this passage explicating the meaning of "[t] he judicial
Power" of Article III. He is defending the idea of life tenure by pointing to
the practice that might be expected of federal judges interpreting the Constitution and laws of the nation. There is a difference between the content of
a legal rule (here, the meaning of "[t] he judicial Power") and expectations
concerning practice under that rule.
Id.
119 Lee, supra note 40, at 663 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
120 Id.
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to "precedents" but to "strict rules," an apparent reference to the unfortunate "voluminous code of laws... necessarily connected with the
advantages of a free government." 12 1 Perhaps together, "precedents"
and "strict rules" might define the court's duty "in every particular
case," but Hamilton could not have been suggesting that every case
122
would be predetermined by the authority of case law.
Indeed, as Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen has explained,
The thrust of Hamilton's discussion is that judges will need to be
familiar with lots of statutes and lots of cases, that this mastery can
be expected of only relatively few men, and that it is important that
the job of federal judge contain sufficiently attractive features to as12 3
sure that such men (and, today, women) will serve in such posts.

Thus, "Federalist78 is fully consistent with a conclusion that precedent serves primarily an 'information' function rather than a 'disposition' function.' 24 Moreover, in "defending the idea of life tenure by
pointing to the practice that might be expected of federal judges,"
Hamilton was not necessarily "explaining what the Constitution
means about the judicial power," but instead was merely "describing
what he expects judges will do-study and consider precedents, as
well as the 'voluminous code of laws'-and that description is consistent . . .with the information function of precedent."125 In fact,

"Hamilton could not possibly have meant by this discussion that precedents.., would be literally binding on judges in the future, that is, that
the habit of consulting precedent was anything other than a rule of
12 6
practice and policy."

Professor Paulsen also points out that for Hamilton to have
claimed that the authority of the judiciary allowed judges to bind future judges by simply deciding a case would have given "powerful ammunition for the Constitution's opponents." 127 As he notes, however,
the Anti-Federalist writer Brutus,
to whom Hamilton was responding more or less directly in The Federalist No. 78, said many disparaging things about the judicial power
and its supposed uncontrollable power. But not even Brutus argued
121

See id. at 663-64 (citing

THE FEDERALIST

ing this same point)).
122 See id. at 664.
123 Paulsen, supranote 40, at 1573.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1574.
126 Id.
127

Id. at 1575.

No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (mak-
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that courts would possess a power to dictate that future courts be
128
bound by precedents, even when they thought them erroneous.
If the Anti-Federalists had understood that he was suggesting that
the judicial power gave judges the power to bind future judges merely
by publishing an opinion, surely Brutus would have responded to such
a claim. 129 Brutus never made such a response, nor did he ever ac130
cuse Hamilton or any of the Federalists of making such a claim.
Finally, Hamilton's discussion of precedent may not have been
focused at all on the question whether a particular court should be
bound by its own prior decisions. The FederalistNo. 78 may simply have
been espousing a "vertical" rule of stare decisis that would limit the
discretion of the lower courts by requiring them to adhere to decisions of superior bodies. 131 Indeed, this was Joseph Story's under128 Id.
129 See id. at 1576. One of the primary claims of the Anti-Federalists was that the
Constitution vested in the judicial branch an unlimited supremacy over the other
governmental branches, and particularly the legislative branch. Brutus wrote that
"[t]his power in the judicial, will enable them to mould the government, into almost
any shape they please." Id. at 1575 nn.111-13 (citing BRUTus No. XI (Jan. 31, 1788),

reprinted in 2

THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST

417, 417-22 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,

1981)). Despite his concern that the Constitution granted federal judges too much
power to subvert the legislature in creating law, Brutus did not base this concern on a
belief that the Constitution allowed judges to forever bind future judges by rendering
a decision (essentially creating law judicially), but rather he was concerned that the
courts would not be bound by any rules but would have complete discretion. See id. at
1575 n.113 ("[I]n their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or
established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason
and spirit of the constitution."). As Paulsen explains, Brutus was concerned more
with the possibility "that courts would build upon precedents in expanding their powers" than the possibility that judges' discretion or power would be. limited by prior
judicial decisions. Id. at 1576 n.113 (citing BRuTus No. XII (Feb. 7, 1788), reprinted in
2 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 423; BRuTus No. XV (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted
in 2 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 441). Paulsen also points out that
[t] he closest Brutus comes to asserting a power of precedent to bind future
judicial interpretations is his claim that "[t]he opinions of the supreme
court, whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no
power provided in this constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul
[sic] their adjudications. From this court there is no appeal.". . .
Just a sentence earlier, however, he argued that the Supreme Court would not be
bound by "any fixed or established rules." Id. at 1576 n.113.
130 See Id. at 1575 nn.1l1 & 113 (suggesting that Brutus's concerns about the
supremacy of thejudiciary stemmed from his belief that the Constitution, in its allocation of the judicial power, gave judges the ability to use precedent to build upon one
another, thus "enabling further departures from a strict reading of the central government's powers").
131 See Lee, supra note 40, at 664 (suggesting that it is unclear "that Hamilton was
discussing the question of whether the Supreme Court would have the power to over-
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standing of the "view of the framers of the constitution" on
precedent-that 'judicial decisions of the highest tribunal" establish
"the true construction of the laws which are brought into controversy
before it," and that such decisions are "plainly supposed to be of paramount and obligation throughout all the states."' 32 Thus, although
Judge Arnold relies on Story for his understanding of the Framers'
views on precedent,13 3 Story was focusing not on a judge's obligation
to follow the decisions of a parallel court ("horizontal" stare decisis),
but on a judge's duty to abide by the decisions of a superior tribunal
("vertical" stare decisis).134
Accordingly, contrary to Judge Arnold's conclusion, the declaratory notion of common-law decisions aligns itself quite closely with the
status that the modem circuit courts accord to unpublished decisions.
Like their common-law counterparts, unpublished decisions may be
cited in some circuits as persuasive authority, but are not treated as
binding on the courts. 135 This treatment would hardly have been
troubling to Hale, Coke, or their contemporaries; it would have been
in line with their general conception of the proper role of judicial
decisions. Judicial decisions in the founding era were seen as "evidence" of the law, to be followed if they were in line with the "custom
of the realm" and not "contrary to reason."' 3 6 In most of the circuit
rule its own decisions; FederalistNo. 78 may simply have been addressing a rule of

vertical stare decisis requiring lower federal courts to follow case law from a superior
tribunal").
132

1 JOSEPH STORY, COvMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 377-378 (5th ed. 1994).
133 SeeAnastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir.), vacated en banc
as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting I STORY, supra note 132, §§ 377-378).
134 See Lee, supra note 40, at 664 n.84 .(discussing Justice Story's view of judicial
decisions as binding precedent in the context of vertical stare decisis).
135 See rules cited supra note 51.
136 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *70. Blackstone explains that when judges
set aside prior decisions, they
do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd
or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law; but that it was
not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been
erroneously determined.
Id.; see also 2 CoKE, supranote 99, at *254(a) (noting that reported decisions are "the
best proofes [sic] [of] what the law is") (emphasis added); 1 HALE, supra note 98, at
*141.
[T]he decisions of courts ofjustice... have a great weight and authority in
expounding, declaring, and publishing what the law of this kingdom is; especially when such decisions hold a consonancy and congruity with resolutions
and decisions of former times. And though such decisions are less than a
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courts today, unpublished opinions have an identical status. They
may be cited for their persuasive power, but a panel of the court need
13 7
not follow them if it deems them unworthy of such deference.
law, yet they are a greater evidence thereof than the opinion of any private
persons, as such, whatsoever.
Id.
137 A few of the circuit rules do purport to forbid the citation of unpublished
decisions for any purpose other than establishing resjudicata, collateral estoppel, or
law of the case. See D.C. CIR. R. 28(b) (prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions, orders, or other dispositions except to establish the binding or preclusive effect
of the disposition); 1sT CIR. R. 36(b)(2) (prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions in all "unrelated cases," presumably meaning only to assert resjudicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case); 2D CIR. R. 0.23 (allowingjudges to make oral opinions from the bench, providing for the transcription of such opinions, and yet prohibiting the citation of such opinions in "unrelated" cases); 3D CIR. R. IOP 6.2 (a
"judgment order" [the functional equivalent of an unpublished opinion] has precedential or institutional value); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 (stating that unpublished opinions
issued prior to January 1, 1996 [the effective date of the amended rule] are precedent, but noting that since "every opinion believed to have been precedential is published, such an unpublished opinion should normally be cited only when the doctrine
of resjudicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case is applicable;" unpublished opinions issued on or afterJanuary 1, 1996 are not precedent, except for the resjudicata,
etc., but may be cited as persuasive authority); 7 TH CIR. R. 53(b) (2) (iv) & 53(e) (stating that a court may dispose of an appeal by an unpublished order or a published
opinion; unpublished orders may only be cited for purposes of establishing res judicata, promissory estoppel or law of the case, whereas published opinion may be cited
without limitation as precedent; also prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions or
orders from any court if that court prohibits its citation); 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (stating that
any disposition that is not an opinion or order designated for publication is not precedent and should not be cited except to show res judicata, etc.); FED. CIR. R. 47.6
(prohibiting citation to opinions "designated as not to be cited as precedent" unless it
is to assert claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, or law of the case).
Rules of this nature arguably are vulnerable to a constitutional challenge that could
not be leveled at rules like the Eighth Circuit rule deemed unconstitutional in Anastasoff. The strict version of the circuit rules does seem to accord a verboten status to
unpublished opinions that is not closely analogous to the treatment ofjudicial authority in the founding era.
Such rules do call to mind, however, the treatment of English common law in
some of the colonies after the revolution. In 1799, for example, NewJersey passed a
law generally providing that
no adjudication, decision, or opinion, made, had, or given, in any court of
law or equity in Great Britain [after July 4, 1776] . . . shall be received or
read in any court of law or equity in this state, as law or evidence of the law,
or elucidation or explanation thereof.
ELIZABETH G. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at 82 (1964); see
also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 111-12 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the same New Jersey statute). An 1807 Kentucky statute was to the same effect-holding that "reports and books containing adjudged cases in . . . Great
Britain ... since the 4th day ofJuly 1776, shall not be read or considered as authority
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The modem treatment of unpublished decisions would have
been familiar to the founding generation for a second reason. Early
American decisions were not readily accessible to the bench and
bar.' 38 "There was no general habit of publishing American decisions; American case reports were not common until a generation or
in... the courts of this commonwealth." BROWN, supra, at 132 n.52; see also FRIEDMAN

supra, at 112 (discussing the same Kentucky statute). Lawrence Friedman describes
one experience under the Kentucky statute:
During Spring Term, 1808, Henry Clay, appearing before the court of appeals of Kentucky, "offered to read" a "part of Lord Ellenborough's opinion"
in Volume 3 of East's reports; the "chief justice stopped him." Clay's cocounsel argued that the legislature "had no more power to pass" such a law
than to "prohibit ajudge the use of his spectacles." The court decided, however, that "the book must not be used at all in court."
Id. at 112.
138 In the Anastasoff opinion itself, the panel admits, "[b]efore the ratification of
the Constitution, there was almost no private reporting and no official reporting at all
in the American States." Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 903. The panel suggests that limited
publication was the rule at the time of the founding, and that the Framers did not
intend the publication of alljudicial decisions. Id. The panel also suggests that in the
absence of wide availability ofjudicial decisions, judges would even rely on their own
memory of decided cases. Id It is certainl' correct that judges at the time of the
founding were accustomed to ruling without the benefit of reported cases, and that
their only resources were a few reported cases (many from England) and their own
memory. It may be presumptuous however to go one step further, as the panel has
done, to assume that this reliance was a result of a need for definitive statements of
the law. It may be more consistent with Blackstone's view of precedent to ilssume that
this reliance upon prior decisions was a search for evidence of what the law was, rather
than a search for definitive statements of the law itself
Interestingly, some legal historians argue that even those cases that were published at the time of the founding were not treated as binding precedent. Theodore
Plucknett, legal historian and author of A Concise History of the Common Law, argued
that even the Year Books, the primary sourcd of published English cases at the time of
the founding, "were not regarded as collections of authoritative or binding decisions."
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr,

A

CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW

346 (5th ed.

1956). Plucknett then cites several respected English justices that question whether
the actual Year Book cases themselves were binding authority. See id. at 346-47.
Plucknett explains that
[i] n the Year Book period cases are used only as evidence of the existence of

a custom of the court. It is the custom which governs the decision, not the
case or cases cited as proof of the custom.... A single case was not a binding authority, but a well-established custom (proved by a more or less casual
citing of cases) was undoubtedly regarded as strongly persuasive.
Id. at 347. This does not mean that the Year Books and other reporters were not
highly esteemed. Blackstone himself refers to the Year Books in his Commentaries, expressing his opinion that it was a "wise institution," that he wished Henry the Eighth
had not discontinued. 1 BLACKsTONE, supra note 97, at *72.
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more after Independence."'1 9 That is not to say that such decisions
were never available, or even that they could not be cited as precedent.1 40 The point is that early American decisions were most closely
analogous to their "unpublished" counterparts today: they were not
readily available in the official reporter, but they were sometimes accessible by other means, and when they were they could be cited for
41
their persuasive (but not strictly binding) power.1
139 FRIEDMAN, supra note 137, at 112; see also Kempin, supra note 114, at 34-35
nn.21 & 23-24 and accompanying text (stating that the early reports bore little resemblance to modem reports). "During the very late eighteenth century and the early
nineteenth century, reliable unofficial reports began to emerge. For instance, Dallas's
reports of United States and Pennsylvania cases were submitted to the public in 1790
as a collection of lawyers' notes." Id. at 34-35 n.21. In addition, "[t ] he earliest of the
official reporters appointed by some organ of the state came into existence in the
early part of the nineteenth century. The movement toward official state reporters

gained momentum in the 1840s and 1850s .... " G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL
COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 203 (abr. ed. 1991) (noting that
"[a]dvocacy before the Marshall Court was an essentially oral medium," that
"[w]ritten briefs were rare," and that "written treatises were neither numerous nor
widely available").
140 As Judge Arnold points out, "jiidges and lawyers of the day recognized the
authority of unpublished decisions even when they were established only by memory
or by a lawyer's unpublished memorandum." Anastasoff,223 F.3d at 903 (citing PETER
KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 30

(1997);JESsE ROOT, THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT AND LAWS IN CONNEcrIcUT
reprinted in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 38-39 (Perry Miller ed., 1962)).

(1798),

141 On the other hand, perhaps Judge Arnold's position in Anastasoff could be
read to suggest a different, much narrower ground on which the Eighth Circuit rule
at issue arguably does depart from the notion of precedent prevailing at the time of
the founding: under Rule 28A(i), a circuit panel is entitled "to depart from the law set
out in [unpublished] prior decisions without any reason to diflerentiate the cases."
Id. at 905. If the founding-era notion of precedent required an overruling court to
articulate a reason for setting aside an earlier decision, then perhaps the modem
treatment of unpublished opinions is constitutionally vulnerable on that narrow
ground. If this is the constitutional defect in the current circuit rules, however, it may
easily be cured by a simple amendment to the rules, without unleashing the pragmatic cataclysm noted above.
Moreover, this narrow objection fails to account for the second historical argument set out in detail below: that unpublished opinions are closely analogous to a set
of judicial decisions that long have been treated as non-precedential. There is little
doubt that judges have long exercised authority to hand down certain summary and
other dispositions without explaining their reasons and without establishing any precedent. If ajudge is within the "judicialpower" in exercising the authority to decide a
claim or objection without offering any explanation, there is little reason to think that
a similar power cannot be exercised by handing down an "unpublished" explanation
for a similar decision. The only difference is a net benefit to the parties from the
judge's explanation.
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If anything, it is the current treatment of published opinions that
would have been seen as an anachronism in the founding era. Ajurist
versed in the declaratory theory would be surprised to learn that he is
foreclosed from setting aside an earlier decision that he finds manifestly unjust, or contrary to reason or custom. Precedent in the founding era was only evidence of the law; it could accordingly be ignored
as "not law" in appropriate circumstances. 14 2 Under current circuit
rules, however, a panel of the court is absolutely forbidden from doing any such thing.143 Thus, as compared to the historical baseline
suggested in the Anastasoff opinion, the prevailing circuit rules do not
reduce unpublished decisions to a lower class of precedent, as Judge
Arnold supposes; they actually elevate published opinions to a higher
degree of deference. 14
Viewed in this light, the circuit rules' dichotomy between published and unpublished opinions is difficult to condemn as a constitutional matter. The Anastasoff vision of the judicial power is that
Article III establishes a floor or minimum level of deference to prior
authority. There is no basis for the conclusion that the Constitution
also establishes a ceiling-precluding federal courts from according
more deference than was contemplated in the founding era; yet that is
exactly what the historical premise of Anastasoffwould require in order to reach the result Judge Arnold proposes.
B.

History and "Second-Class"Precedent

As noted above, the Anastasoff decision may be understood to
stand for the alternative proposition that there is no historical basis
for judicial creation of two separate classes of precedent. Under this
view, if the doctrine of precedent that prevailed at the time of the
142 See supra notes 98-99, 136 and accompanying text.
143 While the treatment of unpublished opinions may vary between the circuits, all
of the circuits have rules stating, either directly or indirectly, that published opinions
are binding precedent. See supra note 13 (discussing the publication rules in all thirteen circuits).
144 This is not to suggest that granting binding effect to published opinions is
either inconsistent with the Constitution or even the modem view of precedent. Article III's grant ofjudicial power would certainly not be violated by limiting the discretion of judges beyond the extent originally intended by the Framers. Furthermore,
the declaratory theory as a viable modem understanding of precedent was abandoned
years ago. See, e.g., Wesley-Smith, supra note 49, at 74 (discussing the effect of positivist theorists such as Austin and Bentham, who argued that the law was not some
amorphic body of legal rules to be discovered, but one to be created as a "product of
judicial will"). Judge Arnold did not base his reasoning on a modem view of precedent, but on the historic view, which is embodied in the declaratory theory despite its
lack of modem acceptance.
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founding had not yet recognized a "second-class" status for unpublished opinions, then arguably the 'judicial power" accorded under
Article III precludes the creation of such status today.
This view of Anastasoff is equally problematic. For one thing, the
doctrine of precedent that prevailed at the time of the founding was
in a state of ongoing flux and transformation, and accordingly, there
is little reason to think that the Framers would have intended to freeze
the doctrine in place as it stood at the time of the framing. 145 Moreover, the historical premise of the argument again is faulty. Historically, the courts have recognized various classes of precedent, and
have long felt comfortable with the notion that some judicial decisions
146
are of lesser precedential value than others.
1. The Founding-Era Doctrine of Precedent Was in a State of Flux
As one of us has noted in an earlier work, a rigid originalist conception of stare decisis may be troubling even if one embraces its legitimacy (as we do) as a general interpretive methodology. 147 The law
governing the proper treatment of precedents is a "doctrine of judicial management"1 48 that has constantly ebbed and flowed to account
for changes in the structure of the court system. For the most part,
the changes over the history of our nation have been subtle and discrete. 149 The founding era, however, "marked an important point of
transition."1 50
145 See infra Part III.B.1.
146 See infra Part III.B.2.
147 See Lee, supra note 40, at 653-55.
148 Id. at 651.
149 See id. (explaining that "If]lor the most part... the modem muddle over stare
decisis has been with us since the founding era," but that some strands of the doctrine
have undergone certain changes). For a sophisticated discussion of stare decisis that
bucks the conventional view that the doctrine of precedent was in a state of flux at the
time of the founding, see Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 8, 10 (2001) (concluding that "for much of our nation's history, the dominant view of stare decisis was . . .remarkably consistent" with the
author's proposed framework of adopting "a rebuttable presumption against overruling decisions that are not demonstrably erroneous while simultaneously recognizing a
rebuttable presumption in favor of overruling decisions that are demonstrably
erroneous").
150 Nelson, supra note 149, at 661 (citation omitted) (explaining that "the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries marked an important point of transition" in the
doctrine); see also infra note 155 (citing further sources in support of the proposition
that the doctrine of precedent was in a stage of transition into the nineteenth
century).

2001]

THE JUDICIAL POWER TO "UNPUBLISH"

OPINIONS

The essence of the transition is evident in the cases discussed in
Section llI.A above. At the earliest stages of the doctrine, Coke and
Hale spoke of the role of precedent in the purest of declaratory terms:
a judicial decision was not law, but mere evidence of it, and accordingly could be disregarded by a subsequent court.15 1 Subsequently,
common-law courts and commentators "began to speak of a qualified
obligation to abide by past decisions," 15 2 under which precedents still
could be set aside, but only if manifestly absurd or contrary to reason
or custom.

153

The founding era roughly coincided with this subtle change. "Although the precise timing of this step in the transition is a subject of
some debate among legal historians, William Blackstone's influential
Commentaries apparently was one of the early authorities to speak of
'the rule of precedent as one of general obligation." 5 4 Thus, most
historians agree that during the period leading up to the framing of
the constitution "the whole theory and practice of precedent was in a
highly fluctuating condition."' 55 The history of the doctrine of state
decisis in this country is marked by similarly subtle and incremental
changes, by which the courts gradually have modified the bases on
156
which an earlier decision may be set aside.
In light of the transitional state of the doctrine of precedent in
the founding era, it seems likely that "the founding generation must
have contemplated that this common-law doctrine ofjudicial management did not foreclose further development of the considerations
that inform the decision whether to retain ajudicial precedent."'1 5 7 In
other words, "even under an originalist conception of the judicial
power," like that embraced in Anastasoff, "further development of the
151 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
152 Lee, supra note 40, at 661.
153 See id. at 661-62.
154 Id. at 661 (quoting MAX RADIN, STABILITV IN LAW 18 (1944)).
155 ALLEN, supranote 94, at 209; see also 12 HoLuswoRTH, supra note 94, at 151-57
(noting that the modem doctrine of precedent was accepted by the latter part of the
eighteenth century, subject to "reservations," such as the "power to disregard cases
which are plainly absurd or contrary to principle"); PLUCENETr, supra note 138, at 350
("[I] t is to the nineteenth century that we must look for the final stages... of the
present system."); POTrER, supra note 95, at 279 (noting that during the eighteenth
century "[o]pinions differ as to the force of individual precedents"). See generallyJim
Evans, Change in the Doctrine of Precedent Duringthe Nineteenth Century, in PRECEDENT IN

LAW, supra note 49, at 35 (noting changes in the British House of Lords' treatment of
its own precedent during the nineteenth century).
156 See generally Lee, supranote 40 (discussing the history of subtle changes of the
doctrine in the United States).
157 Id. at 651.
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standards of stare decisis need not be rejected categorically as
158
ahistorical."
Thus, Anastasoffs now-vacated holding is vulnerable in its most
basic premise-that the Framers intended to enshrine in the 'judicial
power" in Article III their specific understanding of the role of precedent, without the possibility of further adjustments in the future. If
the doctrine was in a particular state of flux at the time of the founding, it seems much more likely that the Framers would have intended
to leave open the possibility of future development. Even if the
founding generation had not yet seized on the idea of according differential treatment to unpublished decisions, they should not have
been offended by the idea-particularly if unpublished decisions can
be analogized to other judicial decisions historically deemed not to
have precedential weight. We turn now to that inquiry.
2.

Historical Recognition of a Hierarchy of Judicial Authority

The concept that certain judicial decisions are less deserving of
precedential effect is wholly consistent with Blackstone's view of judicial decisions as evidence of the law. 15 9 Just as all forms of evidence
are not of the same value, different sorts of judicial decisions have
long received varying levels of deference. Despite Judge Arnold's implicit proposition that the Framers' conception of precedent precludes such a hierarchy, history provides several examples in which
the Article III 'judicial power" has been exercised without the creation of any precedent.
a.

Federal District Court Decisions

Federal district courts, for example, have long exercised their judicial power without creating precedent in the same way that courts of
appeals create precedent. It is commonly accepted that federal district court decisions are treated like unpublished appellate decisions:
they may be disregarded in future cases except for the purposes of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. 160 In Judge Posner's words
districtjudges in this circuit must not treat decisions by other district

judges, in this and afortioriin other circuits, as controlling, unless of
158

Id.

159 1 BLACKSTONE, supranote 97, at *69 ("[T]hese judicial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence of such a
custom as shall form a part of the common law.").
160 See, e.g., Colby v.J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1987); Starbuck
v. City of San Francisco, 556 F.2d 450, 457 n.13 (9th Cir. 1977); 18JAIES WM. MooRE
ET AL.,

MooRE's

FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ 134.02[1] [d] (3d ed. 1999).
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course the doctrine of resjudicata or of collateral estoppel applies.
Such decisions will normally be entitled to no more weight than
161
their intrinsic persuasiveness merits.
Judge Posner was hardly articulating a new rule of law. He was
restating a rule of such historical origin that he apparently saw no
need to cite to any authority. Even before the advent of the official
American reporters, one can find examples of circuitjudges (the contemporary equivalent of the district judge) treating the decisions of
their fellow circuit judges as merely persuasive.' 62 For example, in
Blake v. Robertson the circuit court for the Eastern District of New York
163
dealt with an issue that had been previously examined four times.
In all four of the cases the circuit judges each followed the same rule
regarding the particular issue of patent infringement.'6 4 The Blake
court nevertheless recognized tlat since those courts were all circuit
courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, and since "the supreme court [had
never] been called upon to reverse any of those decisions," the court
was not bound by those decisions and that "the parties to [the] action
[had] the right to a determination of the question by this court in this
action.' 6 5 While the court recognized that the consistency of the previous decisions was deserving of some inference that they were correct, the court was careful to recognize its responsibility to decide the
166
case de novo.
Henry Black recognized this same rule in an early treatise on
stare decisis. Black noted that while such decisions should be given
some deference in the interest of uniformity, they were not binding
67
on other courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
If the federal district courts historically have exercised their 'Judicial power" without creating precedent on par with that created by
appellate courts, then Judge Arnold's thesis is seriously undermined.
It might be argued that the federal district courts differ from appel161 Colby, 811 F.2d at 1124 (emphasis in original).
162 See Taylor v. Royal Saxon, 23 F. Gas. 797, 801 (E.D. Pa. 1849) (No. 13,803); see
also N. Pac. R. Co. v. Sanders, 47 F. 604, 613 (D. Mont. 1891) (identifying this as the
rule that "prevails in the circuit courts of the United States"); Blake v. Robertson, 3 F.
Gas. 602, 603 (E.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 1501) (noting that the decisions of other circuit
courts "do not bind this court").
163 Blake, 3 F. Gas. at 603.
164 See id. ("The first of these questions has been heretofore determined in favor
of the Blake patent by Judge Shipman, by Justice Nelson, by Judge Drummond, and
by Judge Shepley, in other actions which have come before these judges.").
165 Id.
166 See id.
167 See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
§ 99 (1912).
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late courts, in that the former generally finds facts and the latter interprets the law, but that is not always so. Many trial court decisions
involve statutory and constitutional interpretation, and in that task,
district judges exercise power that is indistinguishable from that of
their appellate counterparts. Moreover, both trial and intermediate
courts of appeals are within the "inferior courts" to which the Constitution assigns the same judicial power. 168 If the district courts historically exercised their power without creating any sort of precedent,
there is no reason to think that appellate courts exercising that same
169
power should be precluded from doing the same thing.
b.

Summary Dispositions

The Supreme Court has created its own hierarchy of judicial authority in recognizing that "'appropriate, but not necessarily conclu170
sive, weight' is to be given [to] this Court's summary dispositions."
Summary dispositions, in other words, are not accorded the same level
of deference as cases determined after full briefing, argument, and
deliberation.
This practice of granting a lower level of deference to decisions
reached on summary proceedings also has a long historical pedigree.
Indeed, courts have explicitly suggested that "evidence of... solemn
argument, and mature deliberation" is that "which, upon the doctrine
of stare decisis, should give to this case the weight of authority sufficient
to foreclose the judgment of all other tribunals upon the same question." 7' J.C. Wells's early treatise offered a similar standard, suggesting that although courts generally should follow precedent, "a
168 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
169 But see Martin, supra note 65, at 193-94 (arguing that non-publication rulesspecifically the rules of the Sixth Circuit-are necessary to conserve judicial resources,
and yet suggesting that allowing citations to unpublished opinions would create "a
type of second-class precedent"). Despite his apparent distaste for a "second-class of
precedent," Judge Martin does not appear to oppose the existence of multiple levels
of precedent on a constitutional ground, since he states merely that such a "second
class of precedent" does not help anyone unless there is no published opinion on
point, in which case the unpublished opinion may be cited. See id. at 194. He therefore appears to see the problem not as one between persuasive and binding precedent, but between two levels of binding precedent.
170 Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 180 (1977) (Brennan,J., concurring); see also
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974) (stating that cases decided by summary disposition are "obviously ...not of the same precedential value as would be an
opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits").
171 People ex rel. Griffings v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 9 Barb. 535, 544. (N.Y. Gen. Term
1850).
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court has the right to judge as to whether a question has been for1 72
merly considered and determined with due deliberation.
This analysis is reminiscent of that offered by more modern
17 3
It
Courts in denying precedential effect to summary dispositions.
might just as easily be analogized and extended to disposition by unpublished opinion. By suggesting that the degree of deference accorded a decision may depend on the depth of the court's
consideration, and indeed even by acknowledging the possibility of
such varying degrees, it also casts doubt on Judge Arnold's premise
that the Constitution contemplates but one level of precedent.
c.

Equally Divided Courts

Courts have similarly accorded a lesser degree of deference to
other decisions that have not received "'solemn argument, and due
deliberation,"' such as decisions of an equally divided court.174 When
the appellate panel is equally divided, the settled rule is that it affirms
the ruling below, despite the lack of a majority in agreement to do
so. 175 As Wells explained, "there is an adjudication, nevertheless, in
effect-that is, the decision of the lower court is affirmed-yet it is
plain no binding precedent can thus be established ...." 176 The New
York Court for the Correction of Errors has also noted that "It]he
maxim stare decisis, et non quieta movere, cannot be applicable to such a
case, where the question never has in fact been decided by this
court."

177

The analogy here to a decision by an unpublished opinion is not
quite as apparent. In a sense, an equally divided court creates no precedent because it doesn't decide anything at all-it makes no prece172 J.C. WELLS, A TRFAnSE ON THE DocrRmNEs OF RES ADJUDICATA AND STARE DECISIs 534 (Des Moines, Mills & Company 1878) (emphasis in original).
173 See Mande 432 U.S. at 180 (Brennan, J., concurring); Edelman, 415 U.S. at
670-71.
174 Etting v. Bank of the United States, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) *59, *78 (1826) ("The
principles of law which have been argued cannot be settled."); WELLS, supra note 172,
at 533 (citing several New York state cases as examples, including: Bridge v. Johnson, 5
Wend. 342, 372 (N.Y. 1830) (such a decision merely established the law for the case,
and does not adopt any particular rule); People ex rel. Attorney General v. Mayor of New
York, 25 Wend. 252, 256 (N.Y. 1840) ("The effect of such ajudgment of affirmance is
as conclusive upon the rights of the parties to the judgment as any other; although it
is not considered as settling the question of law as to cases which may arise between
other parties.")).
175 WELLS, supra note 172, at 533.
176 Id.
177 Bridge v. Johnson, 5 Wend. 342, 372 (N.Y. 1830); see also Etting, 6 U.S. (11
Wheat.) at *78.
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dent because arguably it has not exercised any 'Judicial power." But
the mere fact that there is no majority agreement on the result or the
rationale does not mean that the appellate court has not taken action
or has not exercised some species ofjudicial power. Surely there has
been an exercise of some power in hearing argument and in affirming
the lower court. Indeed, the principal difference between an affirmance by an equally divided court and an affirmance by a majority is
that in the latter case there is a ratio decidendi that may be articulated
in an opinion that speaks authoritatively for the court.
This is the same difference, however, between a published and an
unpublished opinion. In the latter case, the court articulates an authoritative result that is binding on the parties and has preclusive effects, but it does not offer an authoritative ratio decidendi. Thus, this
analogy further undermines Judge Arnold's position and demonstrates that courts have long recognized a judicial power to render
decisions that do not result in any sort of precedent.
d.

Custom of the Realm

Finally, in perhaps the most venerable illustration of a hierarchical conception of precedent, Blackstone and his contemporaries recognized that a single case was less persuasive evidence of the law than
a series of cases establishing a "custom of the realm." 7 8 Thus, although an isolated decision of an individual judge might not be conceived as precedent, once that decision had been followed by several
others, it could be treated as legal authority. 179 This conception of
precedent was adopted in a dissent in early New York case, which articulates the view that "[ilt is going quite too far to say that a single
80
decision of any court, is absolutely conclusive as a precedent."
Again, at first glance this analogy might seem inapt. Indeed, in a
sense, this historical standard runs contrary to the modem circuit
courts' treatment of unpublished authority. Whereas a single decision
in Blackstone's era was not authoritative if it broke new legal ground,
such a groundbreaking decision would be precisely the sort of decision that would call for publication today, and thus would create binding precedent. Conversely, routine application of a settled principle
178 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *70.
179 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 97, at *67-*70 (describing the "unwritten, or
common law" as a combination of "general" and "particular" customs adopted and
used by the courts); WELLS, supra note 172, at 537 ("We deny that a recent and solitary decision of any judge, however eminent, ought to be regarded by us as conclusive
evidence of the existing law.").
180 Butler v. Van Wyck, 1 Hill 438, 462 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
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would constitute precedent, but today such a pedestrian decision
would be unpublished and would not be authoritative.
This analysis, however, misconstrues the point of the historical
inquiry. The idea is not that history's version of precedent is precisely
in line with today's circuit rules on unpublished opinions. It is,
rather, that a hierarchy of authority would not have been unfamiliar
to the founding generation. 18 1
CONCLUSION

Judge Arnold's now-vacated opinion in Anastasoff raises a fundamental and significant constitutional issue that cannot be ignored. If
the panel decision is taken at face value, then federal judges at all
levels of the system have long arrogated to themselves an ultra vires
power that is inconsistent with a fundamental postulate of Article III
of the Constitution. But although the historical analysis in Anastasoff
has some superficial appeal, it cannot withstand close scrutiny. The
historical understanding of the role of precedent is, if anything, more
in line with the current status of unpublished decisions than it is with
their published counterparts. Moreover, courts have long accepted a
hierarchy ofjudicial authority that accords precedential weight only to
certain types of decisions, and there is no reason to believe that the
founding generation would have intended to foreclose extension of
that hierarchy to the treatment given to unpublished decisions by the
federal circuit courts today.

181 The argument, moreover, overstates the distinction. Today, the routine application of a settled rule of law may not create precedent, but that is not to say that the
rule itself is not precedential. Rather, the point is that earlier decisions already have
established the principle in question, and there is no particular reason to rehearse its
application in a new case in a way that would elaborate further on that principle.
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